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Secure Users Oriented Downlink MISO NOMA
Hui-Ming Wang, Senior Member, IEEE, Xu Zhang, Qian Yang,
and Theodoros A. Tsiftsis, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper proposes a secure users oriented
multiple-input and single-output (MISO) non-orthogonal mul-
tiple access (NOMA) downlink transmission scheme, where
multiple legitimate users are categorized as quality of service
(QoS)-required users (QU) and the security-required users (SU)
overheard by a passive eavesdropper. The basic idea is to exploit
zero-forcing beamforming (ZFBF) to cancel interference among
SUs, and then several QUs are efficiently scheduled based on
the obtained beamforming vectors to divide the legitimate users
into several user clusters, in such a way that the QUs could
share the concurrent transmissions and help to interfere with the
eavesdropper to enhance SU secrecy. The goal is to maximize
the achievable minimum secrecy rate (MSR) and sum secrecy
rate (SSR) of all SUs, respectively, subject to the secrecy outage
probability (SOP) constraint of each SU and the QoS constraint
of each QU. To provide a comprehensive investigation we consider
two extreme cases that the eavesdropper has perfect multiuser
detection ability (lower bound of secrecy) or does not have
multiuser detection ability (upper bound of secrecy). In the lower
bound case, the Dinkelbach algorithm and the monotonic opti-
mization (MO)-based outer polyblock approximation algorithm
are proposed to solve the max-min secrecy rate (MMSR) and
max-sum secrecy rate (MSSR) problems, respectively. As for
the upper bound case, an alternative optimization (AO)-based
algorithm is proposed to solve the two non-convex problems.
Finally, the superiority of the proposed cases to the conventional
orthogonal multiple access (OMA) one is verified by numerical
results.
Index Terms—Convex optimization, non-orthogonal multiple
access, power allocation, physical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the spectral efficiency becomes one of the key
challenges to handle the increasing demand of data traffic.
Moreover, due to the explosion of emerging services such as
Internet of Things (IoT), 5G cellular communication systems
need to support massive connectivity to meet the demand for
low latency devices and diverse service types [1]. To that end,
non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has been proposed
as a promising technique to exploit limited resources more
efficiently in a non-orthogonal manner [2]. An existing domi-
nant NOMA scheme is to serve multiple users simultaneously
via power domain multiplexing. In the power-domain NOMA
scheme, the targeted information-bearing signals of multiple
users are superimposed for transmission and efficient multiuser
detection technology is exploited at the receiver via successive
interference cancellation (SIC). Generally, the multiple NOMA
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users should be ordered according to their different channel
conditions to facilitate the effective SIC process. In terms of
the information theory, the sum capacity superiority of NOMA
over OMA becomes more significant when the channel con-
ditions of the concurrently served users become more distin-
guishable. Therefore, it is beneficial to schedule NOMA users
with different channel conditions. Moreover, users can also be
distinguished according to their different QoS requirements
[3], [4]. The superiority of NOMA to conventional orthogonal
multiple access (OMA) has been studied in the perspectives
of spectral efficiency, energy efficiency, and fairness [5]–[7].
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communications,
the confidential message is vulnerable to eavesdropping, which
brings about the security challenge of wireless transmission.
Physical layer security (PLS) has been regarded as a key
complementary technology to safeguard communication se-
curity by exploiting the inherent random characteristics of
wireless physical-layer channels [8]–[10]. It is known that
PLS mainly relies on the difference of the receive signal-
to-noise ratios (SNRs) between the legitimate users and the
eavesdropper. Therefore, introducing interference may be ben-
eficial for secrecy enhancement. It is interesting to observe that
the non-orthogonal resource allocation policy will introduce
extra inter-user interference according to the NOMA principle,
which may improve the PLS performance due to the significant
degradation on the receive SNR of the eavesdropper. In this re-
gard, employing the NOMA technology will not only increase
the spectral efficiency, but improve the secrecy performance
concurrently.
Due to the aforementioned advantages, the PLS topic in
NOMA systems has drawn significant attention recently. The
problem to maximize the achievable secrecy sum rate (SSR) in
a downlink single-input single-output (SISO) NOMA system
was firstly studied in [11]. Since then, several analyses and
optimization problems of secrecy transmissions in secure
downlink SISO NOMA systems have been studied in [12]–
[16]. Furthermore, using the multiple-antenna technology, the
SSR optimization problems were studied in downlink multiple-
input single-output (MISO) and multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) NOMA systems by beamforming and power alloca-
tion in [17]–[20]. However, the perfect instantaneous CSI of
the eavesdroppers is required for the designs and optimizations
in the above multi-antenna works, which is difficult to obtain
in practice.
On the other hand, the assumption that the statistical CSI
of eavesdroppers is available has been more widely adopted
in current bibliography, and various NOMA scenarios and
transmission schemes have been investigated from the per-
spective of PLS, e.g., mixed multicasting and unicasting [21],
[22], transmit antenna selection (TAS) [23], [24], artificial
2noise (AN) [25], and large-scale networks [26]. However,
all the above works only focus on the secrecy performance
analysis without optimizing the power allocation that by
proper design can further improve the secrecy performance.
Recently, Chen et al. [27] investigated the ergodic secrecy
rate of massive multi-antenna NOMA systems and optimized
the power allocation for security enhancement. However, the
authors assumed that the eavesdroppers did not have the capa-
bility of multi-user detection, which may underestimate their
wiretapping abilities and lead to an over optimistic secrecy
performance. Furthermore, the conclusions are based on the
approximated lower bound of the ergodic SSR by exploiting
the characteristics of a massive number of antennas, which is
a special case that cannot apply to the general scenario.
Based on the above discussion, we investigate a novel
downlink secure MISO-NOMA system with different cate-
gories of users. We consider that there are two categories
of legitimate users according to their different service re-
quirements: 1) Users with secrecy requirements during the
transmissions; 2) Users with only quality of service (QoS)
requirements. Hereinafter these two kinds of users are called
as security-required users (SU) and QoS-required users (QU),
respectively. This scenario commonly exists in many practical
applications. For example, some users with high secrecy
priority (government officers, etc) will buy the additional PLS
service from operators while some others may not. Another
example is IoT applications such as the Internet of vehicles,
where some sensors require confidential data (e.g., states of
vehicle engines) while the data for some other sensors may
have low or no secrecy requirements (e.g., temperature).
Under the above model, we propose to group the legitimate
users into multiple clusters with one SU and multiple QUs in
each cluster. The SU in each cluster has the highest priority
so the secrecy requirement should be satisfied and the secrecy
throughput should be optimized. Additionally, the concurrent
transmission of the QU signals in a NOMA manner introduces
interferences to enhance the SU’s security under the condition
that their QoS requirements are satisfied.
The main contributions of our paper can be summarized as
follows:
1) Subject to the secrecy outage probability (SOP) constraints
of SUs and QoS requirements of QUs, we investigate
the beamforming and power allocation schemes for the
max-min secrecy rate (MMSR) and max-sum secrecy rate
(MSSR) problems, respectively. Effective user scheduling
schemes are proposed as well. Furthermore, according
to different wiretap capabilities of the eavesdropper, we
discuss both cases that the eavesdropper applies perfect
SIC and no SIC, which correspond to the lower and upper
bounds of the secrecy performance, respectively.
2) For the MMSR problem with a focus on the fairness among
all the SUs with different channel conditions, an efficient
Dinkelbach algorithm is proposed to obtain the globally
optimal solution for the lower bound case, while an alter-
native optimization (AO)-based algorithm is developed to
derive the sub-optimal solution for the upper bound case,
respectively.
3) For the MSSR problem aiming to enhance the confidential
transmission rate, an efficient outer polyblock approxima-
tion based monotonic algorithm is exploited to obtain the
globally optimal solution for the lower bound case, while
the AO-based algorithm is exploited to derive the sub-
optimal solution for the upper bound case, respectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, we present the system model and propose the transmission
and user scheduling schemes for the considered system. We
focus on the MMSR and MSSR problems in Section III and
IV, respectively. Numerical results are presented in Section V
before the conclusion is drawn in Section VI.
Notations: Boldface lower-case and upper-case letters de-
note vectors and matrices, respectively. The transpose, con-
jugate, conjugate transpose, pseudo-inverse, Euclidean norm,
Frobenius norm, trace, and the largest eigenvalue of the
matrix A are denoted as AT , A∗, AH , A†, ‖A‖, ‖A‖F ,
Tr (A), and λmax (A), respectively. {A}+ denotes the op-
eration max {A, 0}. CN (0, σ2N) denotes zero-mean additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with variance σ2N
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we describe the system model, the transmis-
sion and user scheduling schemes and the secrecy performance
metric.
A. System Model
Consider a downlink MISO-NOMA system as shown in
Fig. 1. Since 5G cellular communication systems need to
support massive connectivity due to the explosion of emerging
applications such as IoT, the base station (BS) is equipped
with N antennas and we make a practical assumption that
there exists M > N legitimate users (LUs) equipped with a
single antenna. According to distinct service requirements of
different kinds of users, the LUs are categorized as SUs with
secrecy requirements and QUs with only QoS requirements.
There is a passive eavesdropper (Eve) equipped with a single
antenna which potentially overhears the targeted messages
for all the SUs. We make a practical assumption that the
instantaneous CSI of Eve is absent and only its statistical CSI
is available. On the other hand, we assume that Eve knows
the CSI of itself.
Based on the described user categorization, our goal is
to achieve better secrecy performance of the SUs and to
simultaneously satisfy the QoS requirements of the QUs, and,
thus, the spectral efficiency of the system can be improved.
To achieve this goal, the basic idea is to group the LUs into
multiple clusters with one SU pairing with several QUs in each
cluster. The detailed transmission and user scheduling schemes
are discussed in Section II-B and Section II-C, respectively.
B. Transmission Scheme
Under the proposed cluster-based downlink NOMA system
model, there is one SU and multiple QUs in each cluster.
The BS fully exploits the spatial degree of freedom (DoF) to
design the distinct beamforming vector for each user cluster,
3˖SU
˖QU
˖Eve
BS
Fig. 1. The considered downlink cellular network with a multi-antenna
BS, multiple single-antenna legitimate users categorized as SUs and QUs,
and a passive eavesdropper Eve. The NOMA technology is exploited to
simultaneously serve multiple users under each spatial beam.
which means that the scheduled LUs in each cluster are served
by a common beam in a NOMA manner [27], [28]. To fully
exploit the spatial DoF, we make an additional assumption
that the number of LUs is M = N × K and M LUs are
divided into G = N clusters with K users in each cluster.
Since available resources are shared in the NOMA scheme,
there may exist both intra-cluster interference and inter-cluster
interference between LUs. Since the SU in each cluster has the
highest priority to achieve secrecy transmission, we propose a
zero-forcing beamforming (ZFBF) scheme with respect to all
the SUs [29], i.e., multiple SUs in different clusters have no
inter-cluster interference. This scheme has the following two
merits:
1) The ZFBF scheme alleviates the effect of inter-cluster
interference of the SUs, which is beneficial to enhance the
signal-to-interference-and-noise ratios (SINRs) and, hence,
the secrecy performance can be improved.
2) In each cluster, the SU and the QUs share the available
resources in a non-orthogonal way. Except for the spectral
efficiency enhancement, the intra-cluster interference in
each cluster will confuse the potential Eve in order to
further improve the secrecy throughput.
All the wireless channels are assumed to experience quasi-
static Rayleigh block fading. Specifically, the independentN×
1 channel coefficient vector from the BS to the k-th LU in the
g-th cluster is denoted as hg,k ∼ CN (0, IN ). Without loss
of generality, the SU is represented by the first user in each
cluster. Define
H1 = [h1,1,h2,1, ...,hG,1]
T
, (1)
and then by employing the ZFBF scheme, the beamforming
matrix is given as
W˜ = [w˜1, w˜2, ..., w˜G] = H1
∗(H1H1
∗)
−1
. (2)
We define wg = w˜g/‖w˜g‖ as the N × 1 normalized beam-
forming vector for the g-th cluster. By applying the NOMA
protocol, the superimposed downlink signal transmitted by the
BS is formulated as
x =
G∑
g=1
wgxg =
G∑
g=1
wg
(
K∑
k=1
√
αg,kPsg,k
)
, (3)
where xg is the transmitted superposition signal for the g-th
cluster, P is the total power consumption at the BS, αg,k is
the power allocation coefficient for the k-th user in the g-th
cluster, and sg,k is the targeted signal for the k-th user in the
g-th cluster which satisfies E
{
|sg,k|2
}
= 1.
C. User Scheduling-Based SIC
As described in the above two subsections, G clusters are
grouped, and one SU and K−1 QUs in each cluster are served
by a common beam. Under this condition, since a random
division may lead to a poor performance of our proposed
scheme, the effective user scheduling should be carefully
designed to achieve better secrecy performance and enhance
the spectral efficiency. Specifically,G SUs are firstly scheduled
and the corresponding beamforming vectors are designed in
(2) according to their instantaneous CSI. Then based on the
obtained beamforming vectors wg, K − 1 QUs with similar
channel fading vectors to the SU are scheduled in each cluster
to alleviate the effect of inter-cluster interference. In addition,
since the SU in each cluster has the highest priority, the QUs
are scheduled to simultaneously ensure that the SU has the
channel superiority in each cluster for secrecy performance
enhancement, namely,∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2 > ∣∣hHg,2wg∣∣2 > · · · > ∣∣hHg,Kwg∣∣2. (4)
where the ordering of the effective channel gains of the QUs
in each cluster is assumed without loss of generality. Based
on the above user scheduling policy, the receive signal of the
k-th user in the g-th cluster is expressed as
yg,k = h
H
g,k
G∑
i=1
wi

 K∑
j=1
√
αi,jPsi,j

 + ng,k, (5)
where ng,k ∼ CN
(
0, σ2N
)
is the additive noise.
According to the NOMA principle, strong users in each
cluster have the ability to avoid the interference caused by the
weaker users and the SIC method is exploited. Specifically,
the n-th user will firstly detect and eliminate all the targeted
signals of them-th user (m > n) in a successive way, and then
the targeted signal of the n-th user is detected by treating the
remaining other users’ signals as noise. In our case, the SINR
of each LU in the g-th cluster is
SINRg,1 =
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1, (6)
SINRg,k =
Sg,k
Ig,k1 + I
g,k
2 + 1
, k = 2, ...,K, (7)
where ρ = P
σ2
N
denotes the average transmit SNR at the
BS, Sg,k =
∣∣∣hHg,kwg∣∣∣2ραg,k is the receive power of the
desired signal, Ig,k1 =
∣∣∣hHg,kwg∣∣∣2∑k−1j=1 ραg,j accounts for
the partially cancelled intra-cluster interference after SIC,
4Ig,k2 =
∑G
i=1,i6=g
∣∣∣hHg,kwi∣∣∣2∑Kj=1 ραi,j denotes the inter-
cluster interference, and the third term is the power of nor-
malized AWGN noise.
Remark 1. Though the optimal decoding order or user pairing
for NOMA has been investigated in [13], [30], [31], these
works are generally focused on the single-antenna scenarios.
In contrast, the optimal design in our considered multi-antenna
user cluster based system is quite complicated. Due to the
high complexity of the optimal design, we have discussed a
specific and novel secure users oriented transmission and user
scheduling scheme and the simulation results in Section V
demonstrate that under some certain conditions, the secrecy
performance of our proposed scheme is better than that of
traditional beamforming design only. The optimal design of
the problem is beyond the scope of this paper and will be
investigated in our future work.
D. Eavesdropping Model
If the targeted user is the SU in the g-th cluster, the receive
signal at Eve is formulated as
yge = s
g
e,1 + s
g
e,2 + s
g
e,3 + ne, (8)
where sge,1 = h
H
e wg
√
αg,1Psg,1 denotes the desired sig-
nal of Eve, sge,2 = h
H
e wg
∑K
k 6=1
√
αg,kPsg,k and s
g
e,3 =
hHe
∑G
i=1,i6=gwi
(∑K
k=1
√
αi,kPsi,k
)
are the interference
from the signals of the intra-cluster users and inter-cluster
users, respectively, and ne ∼ CN
(
0, σ2N
)
is the additive noise.
he ∼ CN (0, IN) is the N×1 channel coefficient vector from
the BS to Eve, and the statistical CSI of Eve is available at
the BS according to Section II-A.
From (8), both intra-cluster and inter-cluster interferences
exist when Eve detects the targeted signals of SUs. In order
to provide a comprehensive investigation on the impact of such
interferences on the secrecy performance, two extreme cases
are considered according to different assumptions about the
multiuser detection ability of Eve.
1) Lower Bound of secrecy performance: In this case, we
consider the worst-case scenario that Eve has powerful
multiuser detection ability, which is a commonly used
assumption on the detection ability of Eve in the existing
NOMA PLS literatures [11]–[14]. Specifically, Eve can
distinguish the multiuser data streams from BS and thus
decode each target signal only under the impact of noise
without interference, which leads to the theoretical lower
bound of the secrecy performance with respect to the de-
tection abilities of Eve. The SNR of detecting the targeted
signal of the SU in the g-th cluster is formulated as
SINR(e)g =
∣∣hHe wg∣∣2ραg,1. (9)
2) Upper Bound of secrecy performance: In this case, we
assume that Eve has no multiuser detection ability. Under
this condition, Eve detects the targeted signal under both
the AWGN noise and all the interferences. The SINR of
detecting the targeted signal of the SU in the g-th cluster
is formulated as
SINR(e)g =
S
(e)
g
I
(e)
g,1 + I
(e)
g,2 + 1
, (10)
where S
(e)
g =
∣∣hHe wg∣∣2ραg,1 is the receive power
of the targeted signal, I
(e)
g,1 =
∣∣hHe wg∣∣2∑Kk 6=1 ραg,k
denotes the intra-cluster interference and I
(e)
g,2 =∑G
i=1,i6=g
∣∣hHe wi∣∣2∑Kk=1 ραi,k accounts for the inter-
cluster interference.
Remark 2. Since Eve is a passive eavesdropper overhearing
the confidential transmissions, it is general and practical that
we don’t make a specific assumption on the location of Eve. In
addition, it should be pointed out that our aforementioned se-
cure users oriented transmission and user scheduling scheme is
essentially channel-dependent rather than location-dependent,
which also indicates that it does not matter whether Eve is
located in the cluster or not.
Remark 3. In practice, the detection capability of Eve always
lies between the perfect cancellation and no cancellation of
interferences. Therefore, the cases in which the intra-cluster
interference and the inter-cluster interference can be partially
subtracted and Eve detects the targeted signal under the impact
of noise and residual interference are more practical. We note
that it could be considered as a special case of the upper
bound case, since the receive SINR of each SU takes the same
form as (10) with only different terms of interference in the
denominator. We will see later that our proposed optimization
algorithms are also applicable to these cases.
Remark 4. On the other hand, the SNR in (9) could be
mathematically viewed as a special case of the SINR in
(10) when I
(e)
g,1 = 0 and I
(e)
g,2 = 0, which implies that the
optimization algorithm studied for the upper bound case also
applies to the lower bound case. However, we will see in the
following that with (9), the globally optimal solution could be
achieved while this is not the case when dealing with (10).
That is why we will discuss the lower bound case exclusively.
Remark 5. Under some practical scenarios that Eve has partial
detection capability such as SIC ability, the corresponding
SINR has the same form as (10), where I
(e)
g,1 and I
(e)
g,2 represent
the residual intra-cluster and inter-cluster interference after
partial interference cancellation. As a result, all the cases
that Eve has different partial detection capabilities can be
considered as special ones of the upper bound case and our
optimization algorithms are also applicable to these cases.
E. Secrecy Performance Metrics
If the instantaneous CSI of the wiretap channel is available
at BS, the achievable secrecy rate Rs,g of the SU in the g-th
cluster can be defined as
Rs,g ≤
{
C (SINRg,1)− C
(
SINR(e)g
)}+
, (11)
where C (ρ)
∆
= log2 (1 + ρ). However, since the instantaneous
CSI of he is not available and is treated as a random variable
5as aforementioned in Section II-A, using (11) cannot directly
determine the exact secrecy rate. Under this condition, given
a constant Rs,g (in the optimization problem Rs,g is treated
as a optimization variable) the SOP is introduced as
Pg = Pr
{
C
(
SINR(e)g
)
> C (SINRg,1)−Rs,g
}
. (12)
Based on the theory of the wiretap code [13], the posi-
tive difference of the maximum codeword transmission rate
C (SINRg,1) and the secrecy rate Rs,g is the redundant rate
cost to provide security against Eve, and SOP is defined as
the probability that the Eve’s channel capacity exceeds the
redundant rate as in (12).
As mentioned before, our goal is to maximize the secrecy
rate Rs,g under the SOP constraints of the SUs and the QoS
constraints of the QUs. In the NOMA system, we consider two
kinds of performance metrics, namely, the minimum secrecy
rate (MSR) and SSR of all the SUs. Since the beamforming
vectors have already been determined according to the zero-
forcing criteria, our aim is to optimize the power allocation
strategy. The specific problems will be introduced and effi-
ciently solved in Sections III and IV, respectively.
III. MAX-MIN ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
In this section, we design the optimal power allocation
strategies in both the lower and upper bound cases respectively.
In particular, we maximize the minimum secrecy rate of
the SUs subject to the SOP constraints of SUs, the QoS
requirements of QUs, and the total available transmit power
constraint. The objective of MMSR reflects the fairness of the
confidential transmission considering different CSI conditions
of SUs.
A. Problem Formulation
According to the aforementioned requirements, the MMSR
problem is formulated as follows:
max
a,Rs,g
min
1≤g≤G
{Rs,g}+ (13a)
s.t. Pg ≤ ε, g = 1, 2, ...G (13b)
SINRg,k≥rg,k, g=1, 2, ..., G; k = 2, ...,K (13c)
G∑
g=1
K∑
k=1
αg,k ≤ 1, (13d)
where a = {αg,k, g = 1, 2, ..., G, k = 1, 2, ...,K} represents
the set of all the power allocation coefficients. Constraint (13b)
includes the SOP constraints of all the SUs, where ε is the
maximum allowable SOP threshold. Constraint (13c) includes
the QoS requirements of all the QUs where rg,k is the SINR
threshold, and (13d) is the total power consumption constraint.
According to (12), Rs,g should be lower than C (SINRg,1)
in order to satisfy the required SOP constraint, and thereby
can be expressed as the form of C (SINRg,1) subtracting a
positive redundancy term. We introduce new slack variables
z = {zg ≥ 0, g = 1, 2, ..., G} and directly transform the SOP
as
Pg = Pr
{
SINR(e)g > zg
}
, (14)
where zg satisfies the following inequality
Rs,g ≥ log2 (1 + SINRg,1)− log2 (1 + zg) . (15)
After transforming problem (13) into its epigraph form [32]
and substituting (6), (7), (14) and (15) into the transformed
problem, the MMSR problem can be reformulated as
max
a,z
min
1≤g≤G
{
log2
(
1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1
1 + zg
)}
(16a)
s.t. Pr
{
SINR(e)g > zg
}
≤ ε, g = 1, 2, ..., G (16b)
Sg,k
Ig,k1 + I
g,k
2 + 1
≥ rg,k, k = 2, ...,K, and (13d).
(16c)
We note that problem (16) is equivalent to problem (13).
On one hand, since the left-hand side of constraint (16b)
is a monotonically decreasing function of zg, this constraint
is active at the optimum to reduce the redundancy term
log2 (1 + zg). Under this condition, by comparing the expres-
sions of SOP in (12) and (14), we can obtain that the inequality
(15) is active and thus the equivalence is proved. On the other
hand, the {·}+ operation can be ignored due to the fact that
each term in the objective function must be non-negative at
optimality. This is because if Rs,g < 0 for any g, we can
always stop transmitting the desired signal for the SU in the
g-th cluster.
According to Section II-C, since Sg,k =∣∣∣hHg,kwg∣∣∣2ραg,k, Ig,k1 = ∣∣∣hHg,kwg∣∣∣2∑k−1j=1 ραg,j and
Ig,k2 =
∑G
i=1,i6=g
∣∣∣hHg,kwi∣∣∣2∑Kj=1 ραi,j are linear functions
of power allocation coefficients, constraint (16c) can be
transformed as Sg,k ≥ rg,k
(
Ig,k1 + I
g,k
2 + 1
)
, which is
an inequality constraint composed of linear functions.
Additionally, constraint (13d) is also a linear inequality
constraint with the sum of all the power allocation coefficients
in the left-hand side. However, due to the linear-fractional
form as well as the min (·) operation in the objective function,
and the probabilistic constraint in (16b), problem (16) remains
difficult to be directly solved.
B. Proposed Method for the Lower Bound Case
In the lower bound case, we first substitute (9) into (16b),
which is in a quadratic form, and we then approximate the
probability constraint by a deterministic form to deal with its
non-convexity. It can be easily observed that (16b) can be
rewritten as
Pr
{
h˜He Σ
(l)
g h˜e > zg
}
≤ ε, (17)
where h˜e ∼ CN (0, IN ) and Σ(l)g = wgwHg ραg,1. To further
transform the SOP constraint, we introduce the following
lemma [33]:
Lemma 1. (Bernstein-type inequality) LetG = hHQh where
h ∼ CN (0, IN ) and Q ∈ CN×N is a Hermite matrix. Then
6for any σ > 0, we have
Pr
{
G≥Tr (Q)+
√
2σ‖Q‖F+σ·{λmax (Q)}+
}
≤exp (−σ) .
(18)
Proof. The detailed proof can be seen in Appendix A.
The Bernstein-type inequality is known as a standard tech-
nique to deal with probabilistic constraints involving the
quadratic form of a Gaussian random vector [34]. Applying
Lemma 1 and defining Θg
∆
= h˜He Σ
(l)
g h˜e, it is straight-forward
to obtain that
Pr
{
Θg≥Tr
(
Σ(l)g
)
+
√
2σ
∥∥∥Σ(l)g ∥∥∥
F
+σ·
{
λmax
(
Σ(l)g
)}+}
≤exp(−σ).
(19)
Then, by letting σ = ln
(
ε−1
)
, we can approximately trans-
form the SOP constraint into 1
zg ≥ Tr
(
Σ(l)g
)
+
√
2σ
∥∥∥Σ(l)g ∥∥∥
F
+σ ·
{
λmax
(
Σ(l)g
)}+
. (20)
Since Σ
(l)
g is a linear function of αg,1, the transformed SOP
in (20) is convex.
We now deal with the non-convexity of the objective func-
tion. By exploiting the monotonicity of logarithmic function,
it is observed that the objective function can be transformed
as
max
a,z
min
1≤g≤G
{
1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1
1 + zg
}
. (21)
Since the numerator and the denominator of (21) both are
linear functions of the optimization variables, the transformed
problem is a standard fractional programming problem which
can be solved by the Dinkelbach algorithm [35] for obtaining
the globally optimal solution. Specifically, we introduce the
initialized λ = 0 as the iteration parameter. In each iteration,
by utilizing the introduced λ, the optimization problem is
transformed into
max
a,z,τ
τ (22)
s.t. 1+
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1−λ (1 + zg)≥τ, g = 1, 2, ..., G,
(16c) and (20),
which is a convex problem that can be solved by some
efficient solvers such as CVX [36]. After finite steps of
iterations, the obtained result converges to the globally optimal
solution within the predefined error tolerance. The algorithm
is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Remark 6. (Tightness of Approximation) It should be noted
that the tightness of the Bernstein-type inequality highly relies
on the selection of parameter σ. If we choose σ = ln
(
ε−1
)
in (20), the Bernstein-type inequality will act as a very
conservative approximation, which deteriorates the secrecy
performance of the system. Thus the value of σ should
be elaborately adjusted to achieve a high tightness of the
approximation. The conservative property of the Bernstein-
type inequality and the specific adjustment method will be
discussed in detail in Section III-D.
1Some detailed discussions will be presented in Remark 6.
Algorithm 1 Dinkelbach Algorithm for the MMSR Problem
in the Lower Bound Case
1: λ1 = 0;
2: Set the allowable tolerance δ ≪ 1. Initialize the iteration
index n = 1 and Judgemark = 0.
3: Repeat:
4: Solve the problem (22) with λ = λn. Obtain the optimal
solution α
∗(n)
g,k and z
∗(n)
g in the n-th iteration
5: (Compare) If
min
1≤g≤G
{
1+
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ρα∗(n−1)g,1 −λn (1+z∗(n−1)g )}≤δ,
set Judgemark = 1.
6: Update λn+1 = min
1≤g≤G
1+|hHg,1wg|2ρα∗(n)g,1
1+z
∗(n)
g
;
7: Update n = n+ 1 ;
8: Until: Judgemark = 1
9: The optimal value of the problem is λn−1;
Remark 7. (Feasibility) It should be pointed out that to satisfy
the QoS requirements of all the QUs, there exists a feasible
region shaped by these constraints, and the optimal solution
only exists when the feasible region is not empty. Therefore,
the target QoS thresholds and the scheduled QU’s channel
quality have a significant impact on the achievable secrecy
performance. The QU scheduling scheme can be carefully
designed to enlarge the feasible region of the optimization
problem (13). Specifically, since the intra-cluster interference
has been partially removed by SIC and the ZFBF vectors are
designed according to the instantaneous CSI of the SUs, the
inter-cluster interference will play a significant role on the
SINRs of the QUs. Inspired by the above observations, an
effective QU scheduling scheme is that the QUs in the same
direction are scheduled as a cluster pairing with each SU,
which aims to make the channel fading vectors of the SU
and QUs in each cluster have higher correlation. Specifically,
we schedule the QUs into the g-th cluster with the following
condition:
hHg,khg,1
hHg,1hg,1
> φg,k, g = 1, 2, ..., G, k = 2, 3, ...,K, (23)
where φg,k represents the required threshold for the channel
correlation coefficient between the instantaneous CSI of the
k-th user and the SU in the g-th cluster (The subscript of φg,k
is omitted in the following sections for notional simplicity).
C. Proposed Method for the Upper Bound Case
In the upper bound case, we substitute (10) into (16b) to
obtain the specific form of the SOP and then exploit the similar
method to handle the SOP constraint. The transformed SOP
constraint has the same form as (17) while
Σ(u)g =Wg,1 −Wg,2 −Wg,3, (24)
where Wg,1 = wgw
H
g ραg,1, Wg,2 = zgwgw
H
g
∑K
k 6=1 ραg,k,
and Wg,3= zg
∑G
i=1,i6=gwiw
H
i
∑K
k=1 ραi,k. It can be easily
recognized that Σ
(u)
g is a Hermite matrix. Then, we exploit the
Bernstein-type inequality and obtain the same form as (19),
7where σ should also be adjusted to reduce the conservatism
as in Section III-D. Then, we can approximately transform
the SOP constraint as the same form as (20). The max-min
problem can be formulated as
max
z
min
1≤g≤G
log2
(
1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1
1 + zg
)
(25)
s.t. (16c) and (20).
However, since Σ
(u)
g consists of the product of variables z
and a in Wg,2 and Wg,3, the right-hand side of (20) is not a
linear function of optimization variables and consequently the
transformed constraint is still non-convex. To deal with the
non-convexity of the objective function and the transformed
SOP constraint, we propose an AO-based algorithm and de-
couple the problem (25) into two sub-problems.
1) Sub-problem 1: Fix a and Optimize z :
In the (m+ 1)-th iteration, when the optimal
a(m) =
{
α
(m)
g,k , g = 1, 2, ..., G, k = 1, 2, ...,K
}
in the
m-th iteration is obtained, we fix a(m) and optimize
z = {zg, g = 1, 2, ..., G} to solve the following problem:
max
z
min
1≤g≤G
log2
(
1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ρα(m)g,1
1 + zg
)
, s.t. (20) (26)
Since problem (26) only has variable z, the original product
terms of z and a can be seen as the linear terms of variable
z in this sub-problem and the constraints of problem (26) is
thereby convex. By exploiting the monotonicity of logarithm,
the objective function is transformed as
min
z
max
1≤g≤G
1 + zg
1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ρα(m)g,1 . (27)
After introducing the slack variable τ , problem (26) is trans-
formed as follows:
min
z,τ
τ (28a)
s.t. 1 + zg ≤ τ
(
1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ρα(m)g,1 ) , (20), (28b)
which can be easily observed as a convex problem.
2) Sub-problem 2: Fix z and Optimize a :
In the (m+ 1)-th iteration, we fix the obtained
z(m+1) =
{
z
(m+1)
g , g = 1, 2, ..., G
}
and optimize
a = {αg,k, g = 1, 2, ..., G, k = 1, 2, ...,K} by solving
the following problem:
max
a
min
1≤g≤G
log2
(
1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1
1 + z
(m+1)
g
)
(29)
s.t. (16c) and (20).
Similarly, after introducing the slack variable τ , we can
transform the above problem to deal with the non-convexity
Algorithm 2 AO-based Algorithm for the MMSR Problem in
the Upper Bound Case
1: Initialize: a(0) =
{
α
(0)
g,k, g = 1, 2, ..., G, k = 1, 2, ...,K
}
,
m = 0;
2: Repeat:
3: m = m+ 1;
4: Solve problem (28) and obtain the optimal solution z(m) ={
z
(m)
g , g = 1, 2, ..., G
}
with a(m−1);
5: Solve problem (30) and obtain the optimal solution a(m)
with z(m);
6: Until: Convergence
of the objective function as follows:
max
a,τ
τ (30a)
s.t. 1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1 ≥ 2τ (1 + z(m+1)g ) (30b)
(16c) and (20),
which is a convex problem.
Since the objective value with the solutions obtained by
solving the two optimization sub-problems is non-decreasing
over iterations, and the optimal value of (26) is finite due
to the power-limited NOMA system, the iterative solution is
guaranteed to converge to a stationary solution. The proposed
AO-based algorithm is summarized as Algorithm 2.
Remark 8. (Initialization of a(0)) We herein propose an
efficient approach to find an initial feasible solution for the
algorithm by reducing the feasible region and replacing the
non-convex SOP constraint with the convex one. Specifically,
the Σ
(u)
g in the upper bound case can be replaced by the Σ
(l)
g
in the lower bound case and we solve the similar problem like
(22) by removing the denominator of the objective function.
This is because in the practical scenario, if intra-cluster and
inter-cluster interferences are removed at Eve (i.e., lower
bound case), the receive SINR of the targeted signal at Eve
is enhanced, which will lead to a worse secrecy performance.
In other words, if the variables can satisfy the constraints in
the lower bound case, these variables can also satisfy those in
the upper bound case and we can obtain an initial a(0) in the
feasible region.
D. Reducing the Conservatism of Approximation
It is pointed out in Section III-B that the tightness of the
Bernstein-type inequality highly relies on the selection of σ
and thus has a significant impact on the secrecy performance.
Therefore, it is necessary to elaborately select the value of σ
to achieve high tightness of the approximation. Similarly to
the setting of σ in Section III-B, we select σ = ln
(
ε−10
)
by
introducing ε0 to represent the maximum allowable SOP in the
process of optimization. Then, after solving the approximated
problems, the following lemma is introduced to calculate the
actual SOP:
80 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Predefined SOP Threshold ǫ0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Ac
tu
al 
SO
P AO:Max-Min
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Predefined SOP Threshold ǫ0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Ac
tu
al 
SO
P Dinkelbach:Max-Min
Fig. 2. Actual SOP versus predefined SOP parameter ε0. Parameter settings:
G = N = 6, K = 3, a = 4, σ2
N
= −90dBm, φ = 0.9, ε = 10−2, r = 2
for all QUs and P = 40dBm
Lemma 2. Let λi, i = 1, 2, ..., N denote the eigenvalues of
Q in the descending order. If N1 eigenvalues among {λi} are
positive and distinct, then we have
Pr
{
h˜HEQh˜E > z
}
=
N1∑
i=1
N∏
l 6=i
(
1− λl
λi
)−1
exp
(
− z
λi
)
.
(31)
Proof. The detailed proof can be seen in [37].
According to (31), if the optimal values of the optimization
variables have been obtained in the above subsections, we
can exploit eigenvalues to calculate the actual SOP in the
lower and upper bound cases by Lemma 2. To illustrate the
conservatism of the approximation and obtain the relationship
between the actual SOP and the parameter ε0, we solve the
optimization problems with ε0 varying from 0.01 to 1 and
depict the actually achieved SOP as the function of ε0 in Fig.
2. In the process of simulation to obtain Fig. 2, according to the
user scheduling requirement in (23), the specific instantaneous
CSI of the k-th user in the g-th cluster can be modeled as
hg,k =
√
φhg,1 +
√
1− φeˆg,k, k = 2, ...,K, (32)
where φ represents the channel correlation coefficient as
defined in Section III-C and eˆg,k reflects the difference of in-
stantaneous CSI and is independent of hg,1 with independently
and identical distribution (i.i.d) zero mean and unit variance
complex Gaussian distributed entries. As can be seen in Fig. 2,
the actual value of SOP is far less than ε0 in each optimization
problem. Therefore, to achieve high tightness of the Berstein-
type inequality, ε0 is set to ensure the calculated actual value
of SOP to be equal to ε. Since the actual value of SOP is a
nondecreasing function of ε0, we can use the bisection method
to find out the specific value of ε0.
E. Computational Complexity Analysis
1) Lower Bound Case: In each iteration of Algorithm 1,
problem (22) is a linear programming (LP) and the complexity
of solving an LP is O
(
n2LPmLP
)
, where mLP is the number
of linear constraints and nLP is the dimension of optimization
variables [17]. Specifically, we have mLP = G (K + 1) + 1
and nLP = G (K + 1)+1. Therefore, the computational com-
plexity of Algorithm 1 is O
(
ηl1(G (K + 1) + 1)
3
)
, where l1
denotes the number of iterations of the Dinkelbach algorithm
and η denotes the number of bisection iterations to achieve
high tightness of the approximation as described in Section
III-D.
2) Upper Bound Case: The computational complexity of
AO-based Algorithm 2 includes the complexities of solving
the subproblems (28) and (30). The above two subproblems
both are LPs and the complexities are ̟1 = O
(
2G(G+ 1)
2
)
and ̟2 = O
(
(GK + 1)2 (G (K + 1) + 1)
)
in each iteration,
respectively. Then we can obtain that the computational com-
plexity of Algorithm 2 is O (ηl2 (̟1 +̟2)), where l2 denotes
the number of alternating iterations.
IV. MAX-SUM ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
In this section, we design the optimal power allocation
strategy in both lower and upper bound cases that maximizes
the SSR of the SUs subject to the same constraints as in
Section III. The important MSSR metric reflects the maximal
ability to provide confidential transmissions.
A. Problem Formulation
Similar to the process in Section III-A, the MSSR problem
is formulated as follows
max
a,z
G∑
g=1
[
log2
(
1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1
1 + zg
)]
(33a)
s.t. zg≥Tr
(
Σ(i)g
)
+
√
2σ
∥∥∥Σ(i)g ∥∥∥
F
+σ·
{
λmax
(
Σ(i)g
)}+
, (33b)
Sg,k
Ig,k1 +I
g,k
2 +1
≥rg,k, g = 1, ..., G; k = 2, ...,K (33c)
G∑
g=1
K∑
k=1
αg,k ≤ 1. (33d)
where i ∈ {l, u} in constraint (33b) and the index l, u
correspond to the approximated SOP constraint in the lower
and upper bound cases, respectively.
B. MO-based Method for the Lower Bound Case
Due to the non-convexity of the objective function, problem
(33) is also challenging to be solved directly. To further
transform the optimization problem, we first introduce the fol-
lowing definition of the general linear fractional programming
(GLFP) [38].
Definition 1. (GLFP) An optimization problem belongs to
the class of GLFP if it can be represented by the following
formulation:
maximize ϕ
(
f1 (x)
g1 (x)
,
f2 (x)
g2 (x)
, ...,
fm (x)
gm (x)
)
(34a)
s.t. x ∈∆, (34b)
9where the domain ∆ is a non-empty polytope2 in Rn (the
n-dim real domain), function ϕ : Rm+ → R is increasing
on Rm+ , and functions f1, ..., fm, g1, ..., gm : ∆ → R++ are
positive-valued linear affine functions on ∆.
It can be observed that 1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1 and 1 + zg both
are positive-valued linear affine functions and
∑G
g=1 log2 (·)
is increasing on Rm+ . In addition, Σ
(l)
g = wgw
H
g ραg,1 in the
lower bound case and thus all the constraints in (33) are linear
functions of optimization variables, which means the feasible
domain of (33) is a nonempty polytope if it exists. Thus,
problem (33) in the lower bound case fits the characteristics of
the GLFP form by Definition 1 and the hidden monotonicity
in the objective function can be exploited to recognize the
specific GLFP as a monotonic optimization problem that
can be solved by an efficient outer polyblock approximation
algorithm [39] for the globally optimal solution (The basic
mathematical preliminaries of monotonic optimization and the
hidden monotonicity of GLFP will be shown in Appendix B).
Specifically, to solve the problem (33) we first introduce the
vector u = [u1, u2, ..., uG]
T with each element defined as
ug =
1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1
1 + zg
, g = 1, 2, ..., G. (35)
By exploiting the monotonic characteristic of the sum-log
function, problem (33) can be transformed as the following
standard monotonic optimization problem:
max
u
G∑
g=1
log2 (ug), s.t. u ∈ Ξ (36)
where Ξ is defined as
Ξ=
{
u| 1≤ug≤
1+
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1
1 + zg
, 1≤g≤G, {a, z}∈Λ
}
,
(37)
with Λ being the feasible region determined by the constraints
in problem (33). Since a monotonically increasing function
always achieves its maximum over a polyblock at one of its
proper vertices, the outer polyblock approximation algorithm
successively maximizes the increasing objective function on a
sequence of polyblocks that enclose the feasible set Ξ(The
definition of the polyblock and the proper vertices of a
polyblock will be shown in Appendix B). Based on this,
we firstly construct an initialized polyblock B(1) with the
vertex set V (1) that contains only one proper vertex u(1). The
constructed polyblock is supposed to cover the whole feasible
set Ξ. Then we construct the new smaller polyblock B(2) with
a new vertex set V (2) by replacing u(1) with the new vertices{
u˜
(1)
1 , ..., u˜
(1)
G
}
. Each new vertex is generated by
u˜(l)g = u
(l) −
(
u(l)g − ϕg
(
u(l)
))
eg, (38)
where ϕg
(
u(l)
)
is the g-th element of Φ
(
u(l)
)
, which is the
projection of u(l) on the feasible set Ξ, and eg is the unit vector
2Polytope means the generalization to any dimension of polygon in two
dimensions, polyhedron in three dimensions, and polychoron in four dimen-
sions. The detailed explanation can be seen in [38].
Algorithm 3 Outer Polyblock Approximation Algorithm for
the MSSR Problem in the Lower Bound Case
1: Initialize the polyblock B(1) with the vertex set V (1) ={
u(1)
}
, where the elements of the u(1) are
ug = 1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ρ, g = 1, 2...G.
2: Set the allowable error tolerance δ ≪ 1 and initialize the
iteration index l = 1;
3: Repeat:
4: Construct the smaller polyblock B(l+1) with V (l+1) by
replacing u(l) with
{
u˜
(l)
1 , ..., u˜
(l)
G
}
. Each u˜
(l)
g is generated
by (38), where Φ
(
u(l)
)
= λu(l) and λ is obtained by
Algorithm 1 to solve the problem (39);
5: Find u(l+1) by (40)
6: Update l = l + 1;
7: Until:
∥∥u(l) − Φ (u(l))∥∥/∥∥u(l)∥∥ ≤ δ;
8: u∗ = Φ
(
u(l)
)
and the optimal solution of the problem is
obtained by calculating Φ
(
u(l)
)
with the non-zero element only at index g. The projection of
u(l) on the feasible region is Φ
(
u(l)
)
= λu(l) where
λ = max {β|βu ∈ Ξ}
= max
{
β| β≤ min
1≤g≤G
1+
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1
u
(l)
g (1+zg)
, {a, z}∈Λ
}
= max
{a,z}∈Λ
min
1≤g≤G
1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1
u
(l)
g (1 + zg)
. (39)
It is observed that problem (39) can also be solved by
the Dinkelbach algorithm for the globally optimal solution.
After calculating the projection and replacing the vertices,
the feasible set Ξ is still contained in the newly constructed
smaller polyblock. Then we choose the optimal vertex whose
projection maximizes the objective function of problem (36)
by
u(l+1) = argmax
u∈V (l+1)
{
G∑
g=1
log2 (ϕg (u))
}
. (40)
Then we repeat the above procedure to construct smaller
polyblocks iteratively, and the algorithm terminates when a
predefined tolerance is satisfied. The algorithm is summarized
as Algorithm 3.
C. AO-based Method for the Upper Bound Case
The max-sum optimization problem in the upper bound case
can be formulated as
max
a,z
G∑
g=1
[
log2
(
1+
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1)−log2 (1+zg)] (41)
s.t. (33b), (33c), and (33d).
To deal with the non-convexity of the objective function and
the transformed SOP constraint in (33b) with Σ
(u)
g defined
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in (24), we propose an AO-based algorithm and decouple
problem (41) into the following two sub-problems.
1) Sub-problem 1: Fix a and Optimize z : In
the (m+ 1)-iteration, when the optimal a(m) ={
α
(m)
g,k , g = 1, 2, ..., G, k = 1, 2, ...,K
}
in the m-th iteration
is obtained, we fix a(m) and optimize z = {zg, g = 1, 2, ..., G}
to solve the following problem
min
z
G∑
g=1
log2 (1 + zg), s.t. (33b). (42)
It can be observed that the g-th constraint in (33b) is related
to zg and Σ
(u)
g , while Σ
(u)
g defined in (24) is only related
to the power allocation policy and zg. In addition, there is
no constraint that requires the interaction of different zg with
each other. Therefore, G constraints in (42) are independent
with each other. Since the objective function is the sum of
G terms corresponding to zg, the optimization of z can be
decoupled into G independent convex optimization problems
after exploiting the monotonicity of the logarithmic function.
2) Sub-problem 2: Fix z and Optimize a :
Based on the obtained value of optimization
variables z(m+1) =
{
z
(m+1)
g , g = 1, 2, ..., G
}
in the
(m+ 1)-th iteration, we fix z(m+1) and optimize
a = {αg,k, g = 1, 2, ..., G, k = 1, 2, ...,K} to solve the
following problem
max
a
G∑
g=1
log2
(
1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1) (43)
s.t. (33b), (33c), and (33d).
By introducing the slack variables τg, g = 1, 2, ..., G, the (43)
can be transformed as
max
a,τg
G∑
g=1
τg (44a)
s.t. 1 +
∣∣hHg,1wg∣∣2ραg,1 ≥ 2τg (44b)
(33b), (33c), and (33d),
which can be easily observed as a convex problem.
Since the objective value obtained by solving the two
optimization sub-problems is non-decreasing over iterations,
and the optimal value of (26) is finite due to the power-
limited NOMA system, the iterative solution is guaranteed
to finally converges to a stationary solution. By exploiting
the similar method to obtain the initial feasible solution in
Section III-C, the proposed AO-based algorithm is summarized
as Algorithm 4. It should be pointed out that we can take the
same approach as in Section III-D to achieve high tightness of
the approximated SOP constraint and solve the problem (33)
in the lower and upper bound cases.
D. Computational Complexity Analysis
1) Lower Bound Case: Based on the complexity of
solving a LP, the complexity of the projection is ̟3 =
O
(
l3(G (K + 1) + 1)
3
)
, where l3 denotes the number of
Algorithm 4 AO-based Algorithm for the MSSR Problem in
the Upper Bound Case
1: Initialize: a(0) =
{
α
(0)
g,k, g = 1, 2, ..., G, k = 1, 2, ...,K
}
,
m = 0;
2: Repeat:
3: m = m+ 1;
4: Solve problem (42) and obtain the optimal solution z(m) ={
z
(m)
g , g = 1, 2, ..., G
}
with a(m−1);
5: Solve problem (44) and obtain the optimal solution a(m)
with z(m);
6: Until: Convergence
iterations to calculate the projection. Then, the computational
complexity of Algorithm 3 is O (ηl4 (G+ 1)̟3), where η
denotes the number of bisection iterations to achieve high
tightness of the approximation, l4 denotes the number of outer
iterations in Algorithm 3, and (G+ 1) denotes the number of
vertices that need to calculate the projection in each iteration.
2) Upper Bound Case: Similar to Section III-
E, the computational complexity of Algorithm 4 is
O
(
ηl5
(
G+ (G (K + 1))2 (G (K + 1) + 1)
))
, where
l5 denotes the number of alternating optimization iterations.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this part, we numerically evaluate the average
performance of our designed NOMA scheme through
computer simulation. In our considered system, the numbers
of the transmit antennas at the BS and user clusters are set
as N = G = 6, and it is assumed that there are K = 3
legitimate users in each cluster without special instructions.
The independent channel coefficient vector combined with
small-scale fading and large-scale path loss from the BS
to the k-th legitimate user in the g-th cluster is denoted
by hg,k = gg,kdg,k
− a2 , where dg,k represents the distance,
gg,k denotes the Rayleigh fading channel vector, and a = 4
is the path-loss exponent3. To satisfy the user scheduling
requirement, the instantaneous gg,k in each cluster is modeled
in a similar way as (32). As for the distance between
the legitimate users and the BS, we consider three ranges
according to their minimum and maximum distances away
from the BS and the parameters are set as (Dmin,Dmax) =
{(50m, 100m) , (100m, 200m) , (200m, 300m)}. For each
cluster, the distances of the K = 3 scheduled users are
uniformly distributed in these three ranges. Additionally,
the distance between the BS and Eve is represented by
de = 200m. Under this condition, the statistical CSI of Eve
can be expressed as he ∼ CN (0,ΓeIN ) where Γe = d−ae . As
for other constant parameters, the average receive noise power
at LUs and Eve is set as σ2N = −90dBm, the maximum
tolerable calculation error and the predefined maximum
iteration steps of the Dinkelbach algorithm and the outer
3We introduce the large-scale path loss in this section to make our
simulation results more practical and reasonable, which has no effect on
our aforementioned design of transmission scheme, user scheduling, and the
optimization algorithm.
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Fig. 3. Convergence of the proposed algorithms, where the channel correlation
coefficient φ = 0.9, ε = 10−2, and r = 2 for all the QUs.
polyblock approximation algorithm are both set as 10−2 and
50, respectively, and the optimization problem is solved for
100 times with randomly generated channel realizations.
A. Convergence of Proposed Algorithms
Fig. 3 illustrates the convergence of the proposed algorithms
to solve the MMSR and MSSR problems in the upper and
lower bound cases. As can be seen from Fig. 3, all of the
proposed algorithms can converge to the optimal or suboptimal
solutions with finite number of iterations. In addition, for
each proposed algorithm, we notice that the required number
of iterations to converge with randomly generated channel
condition does not appear to be much different from each
other, which implies that the speed of convergence of each
proposed algorithm is not sensitive to the channel parameters.
Moreover, we notice that the rate of convergence of the MO-
based outer polyblock approximation algorithm is significantly
slower than those of the other algorithms, which provides a
trade-off between the secrecy performance and the rate of
convergence.
It is also observed from Fig. 3 that only one iteration
achieves convergence for AO-based and Dinkelbach algorithm-
based solutions. For this observation, it should be pointed
out that the considered downlink NOMA system is severely
interference-limited. In addition, the SOP constraint of each
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Fig. 4. Average MSR and SSR of SUs versus the total transmit power at the
BS for different numbers of QUs in each cluster, where the channel correlation
coefficient φ = 0.9, ε = 10−2 , and r = 2 for all the QUs.
SU and the QoS constraint of each QU are required to be
satisfied. Therefore, the feasible regions of the proposed two
optimization problems are relatively small. Under this condi-
tion, based on the obtained initial solutions, the difference of
the objective function values in the two consecutive iterations
is relatively small and thus only one iteration almost achieves
convergence.
B. Average Secrecy Rates Versus the Total Transmit Power
and the Number of LUs
In Fig. 4, we investigate the average MSR and SSR of
SUs versus the total transmit power at the BS for different
numbers of QUs in each cluster4, respectively. Under the
condition that K = 2 or K = 3, it is observed that both
our proposed two cases are superior to the conventional OMA
one when the transmit power is not too low. Additionally,
the secrecy performance of the upper bound case is improved
obviously as the available transmit power increases. However,
the secrecy performance of the lower bound case is just a
4Under the condition that K = 2, the distances of the scheduled users
are uniformly distributed in (50m, 100m) and (100m, 200m). And under
the condition that K = 4, the distances of the scheduled users are uni-
formly distributed in (50m, 100m), (100m, 200m), (200m, 300m), and
(300m, 400m).
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little bit better and the secrecy performance of the OMA case
is even almost unaffected with the increase of transmit power,
which leads to the result that the performance gap between
the upper bound case and the other two cases becomes larger.
This observation can be reasonably accounted for due to the
fact that the performance gap between the upper bound case
and the other two cases reflects the impact of interference on
the receive SINR of Eve. As the transmit power increases,
more transmit power means more potential interference when
Eve detects its targeted signal in the upper bound case, which
leads to the increasing performance gap.
Furthermore, we notice that the secrecy performance of
the conventional OMA case is superior to our proposed two
cases when the transmit power is not sufficient high under
the condition that K = 4. This observation is due to the fact
that the feasible region is decreased as the number of QUs in
each cluster increases. If there is no feasible power allocation
policy to satisfy all the QoS requirements, the achievable
secrecy rate in this transmission is zero and the average secrecy
performance is highly degraded under this condition.
C. Average Secrecy Rates Versus the Required SOP Threshold
Fig. 5 depicts the average MSR and SSR of SUs versus
the maximum allowable SOP threshold ε, respectively. It is
observed that our proposed two cases are superior to the
conventional OMA one for the both secrecy rate metrics.
Additionally, since the allowable SOP threshold affects the
redundancy term log2 (1 + zg) in the objective function as
described in Section III-A, the secrecy performance of each
case becomes better with more relaxed SOP requirements.
Moreover, it is revealed according to the simulation results
that the performance gap between the three cases becomes
larger with more relaxed SOP requirements.
D. Average Secrecy Rates Versus the Channel Correlation
Coefficient
Fig. 6 depicts the average MSR and SSR of the SUs
versus the channel correlation coefficient φ in (23) and (32),
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coefficient, where ε = 10−2, P = 40dBm, and r = 2 for all the QUs.
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where ε = 10−2, P = 40dBm, and the channel correlation coefficient
φ = 0.9.
respectively. It is observed that the secrecy performance of
the conventional OMA case is unaffected, which can be
easily explained by the fact that there is no inter-cluster
interference due to the orthogonal characteristics. It can also be
observed that if φ is relatively low, the secrecy performances
of our proposed two NOMA cases are worse than that of
the conventional OMA scheme and becomes better with the
increase of φ, due to the fact that the inter-cluster interference
for the QUs can be more sufficiently eliminated. Under this
condition, the QoS requirements of the QUs can be satisfied
with higher probability and the extra transmit power can
be exploited to improve the secrecy performance. According
to this observation, it is pointed out that the efficient user
scheduling is important in our proposed NOMA scheme,
since the achievable secrecy rate falls to zero if the channel
correlation coefficient is relatively small.
E. Average Secrecy Rates Versus the Required SINR Threshold
Fig. 7 depicts the average MSR and SSR of the SUs versus
the required SINR threshold, respectively. It is observed that
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the secrecy performance of the conventional OMA case is
unaffected, which can be easily explained by the fact that
the secrecy performance of SUs is independent with the QoS
requirements of the QUs due to the orthogonal characteristics
of the OMA scheme. It can also be observed that the secrecy
performances of our proposed two NOMA cases are better
than that of the conventional OMA case but gradually becomes
worse as the SINR threshold increases. This observation can be
explained in two aspects. On one hand, the QoS requirements
of the QUs are more difficult to satisfy with the increase
of the SINR threshold and thereby there may not be extra
transmit power for the SUs to achieve secrecy performance.
On the other hand, if the QoS requirements of the QUs are
satisfied, the increase of the SINR threshold leads to more
power allocated to the QUs and less power allocated to the
SUs. Therefore, the secrecy rate performance is degraded.
According to this observation, low-rate service users, such
as IoT receivers, are more suitable to act as the QUs in our
proposed NOMA cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have comprehensively investigated and
optimized both the lower and upper bounds of the secrecy
performance in a downlink MISO NOMA system with legiti-
mate users categorized as security-required and QoS-required
ones. A dynamic user scheduling and grouping strategy has
been proposed and efficient optimization algorithms have
been adopted to achieve the globally optimal and sub-optimal
solutions for the MMSR and MSSR problems in the lower
and upper bound cases. It has been shown that the proposed
NOMA cases can have sufficient superiority over the con-
ventional OMA one in the practical scenario, and some key
parameters, such as the QoS requirements and the required
threshold for channel correlation coefficients, can significantly
affect the secrecy performance of the proposed NOMA cases.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Since Q ∈ CN×N is a Hermite matrix, the eigenvalue
decomposition of Q can be expressed as Q = UHΛU, where
U is the unitary matrix and Λ is the diagonal matrix consisting
of the eigenvalues of the matrix Q. It is noted that since Q is
a Hermite matrix, the eigenvalues of Q are all real numbers.
Then, G = hHQh can be reformulated as
G = hHUHΛUh = (Uh)
H
Λ (Uh) . (45)
Since U is the unitary matrix, hˆ = Uh has the same
distribution as h which means hˆ ∼ CN (0, IN ). Then based
on (45), G can be further transformed as
G =
N∑
n=1
qn
(
hˆ2n,R + hˆ
2
n,I
)
, (46)
where qn denotes the n-th real eigenvalue of the matrix Q and
hˆn,R and hˆn,I represent the real and imaginary parts of the n-
th element of hˆ, respectively. According to the properties of
circular symmetric complex gaussian distribution, hˆn,R and
hˆn,I are independent with each other and both of them satisfy
the distribution of N (0, 1/2). Therefore, we can reformulate
G as
G =
2N∑
n=1
qˆnr
2
n =
2N∑
n=1
1
2
qˆn
(√
2rn
)2
, (47)
where rn ∼ N (0, 1/2) , n = 1, 2, ..., 2N are independent real
random gaussian variables and
qˆn =
{
qn, n = 1, 2, ..., N
qn−N , n = N + 1, N + 2, ..., 2N.
(48)
Finally by applying Lemma (0.1) in [33] and exploiting the
relations that
∑N
n=1 qn = Tr(Q) and
∑N
n=1 q
2
n = ‖Q‖2F ,
Lemma 1 is proved.
APPENDIX B
MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
In this appendix, we will provide some basic preliminaries
of monotonic optimization and show the hidden monotonicity
of GLFP [38].
Definition 2. (Increasing functions) A function f : Rn+ → R
is increasing if f (x) ≤ f (y) when 0 ≤ x ≤ y.
Definition 3. (Boxes) If a ≤ b, then box [a,b] is the set of
all x ∈ Rn satisfying a ≤ x ≤ b.
Definition 4. (Normal sets) A set Ω ⊂ Rn+ is normal if for
any point x ∈ Ω, all other points y such that 0 ≤ y ≤ x are
also in set Ω. In other words, Ω ⊂ Rn+ is normal if x ∈ Ω⇒
[0,x] ⊂ Ω.
Definition 5. (Conormal sets) A set Ψ is conormal if x ∈ Ψ
and y ≥ x implies y ∈ Ψ. The set is conormal in [0,b] if
x ∈ Ψ⇒ [x,b] ⊂ Ψ.
Definition 6. (Normal hull) The normal hull of a set Φ ⊂ Rn+
is the smallest normal set containing Φ. Mathematically, the
normal hull is given by N (Φ) = ∪Z∈Φ [0,Z].
Definition 7. (Canonical monotonic optimization formula-
tion) Monotonic Optimization is concerned with problems of
the form max {f (x)|x ∈ Ω ∩Ψ}, where f (x) : Rn+ → R is
an increasing function, Ω ⊂ [0,b] ⊂ Rn+ is a compact normal
set with nonempty interior, and Ψ is a closed conormal set
on[0,b].
Definition 8. (Upper boundary) A point x¯ of a normal
closed set Ω is called an upper boundary point of Ω if
Ω ∩ {x ∈ Rn+∣∣x > x¯} = ∅. The set of all upper boundary
points of Ω is called its upper boundary and denoted by ∂+Ω.
Definition 9. (Polyblocks) A set P ⊂ Rn+ is called a
polyblock if it is a union of a finite number of boxes [0,Z],
where Z ∈ Γ and |Γ| < +∞. The set Γ is the vertex set of
the polyblock.
Definition 10. (Proper vertices of a polyblock) Let Γ be the
vertex set of a polyblock P ⊂ Rn+. A vertex v ∈ Γ is said to
be proper if there is no vˆ ∈ Γ such that vˆ 6= v and vˆ ≥ v.
A vertex is said to be improper if it is not proper. Improper
vertices can be removed from the vertex set without affecting
the shape of the polyblock.
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In general, the constraints derived from practical systems
may result in an arbitrarily shaped feasible set. Then the
following proposition shows that this kind of problem can
still be formulated into the canonical form as long as f (x) is
increasing.
Proposition 1. If Φ is an arbitrary nonempty compact set on
Rn+ and Ω = N (Φ) is the normal hull of Φ, then the problem
max {f (x)|x ∈ Φ} is equivalent to max {f (x)|x ∈ Ω}.
Based on the above definitions, the predefined
problem (34) in Section IV-B is equivalent to
max {φ (y)|y ∈ u (∆)}, which can be further written
as max {φ (y)|y ∈ Ω} by Proposition 1, where
Ω = N (u (∆)) =
{
y ∈ Rm+
∣∣y ≤ u (x) ,x ∈∆}. Since
u (x) is continuous on ∆, u (∆) is compact. Thus, its
normal hull Ω is also compact and is contained in box [0,b].
Furthermore, since all ui (x) are positive, Ω has a nonempty
interior. By this, we conclude that the transformed problem
is a monotonic optimization problem in the canonical form.
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